Yes! Our election track record suggests the need for a more rigorous business approach to election equipment. Quick-quick dump the punch cards. Hurry up and scrap the touch screens. Errors will occur…technology just speeds up the process and mega-increases the volume. Our procedures and laws need to be brought inline with technology.
Paper ballots offer the means to verify and recount votes. Unfortunately, these and other paper trails will not ensure one-voter-one-vote-every-time with state-of-the-art independent, stand-alone vote counting machines. Optical ballot scanners are just as suspect as touch screens. Until we implement high-bar stringent guidelines for voting machine providers and elections officials to uphold, until we fix our election laws to protect us from machine and human error, and human interpretation our election process will continue to be broken.
Lani Massey Brown, A MARGIN OF ERROR: BALLOTS OF STRAW, a novel
Gary McGath
· 2 years ago
I disagree with the comparison, because software for voting machines should be dead simple. It should run on dedicated hardware, not on Windows. It should be designed according to principles which make it immune from attack in a way that an Internet device or a computer which loads arbitrary files can never be.
And every new version of the software SHOULD be recertified from scratch.
But Rubin's comments do apply to existing voting machine software, and are an excellent argument against using it. Every time gaping holes are found in its voting systems, Diebold cries, "But the next version fixes it!" Sure, we'll believe it when that version is shown to be free of security flaws by equally extensive testing.
eee_eff
· 2 years ago
You Can’t Patch an Election
Really? I thought Bush did a good job of 'patching' his loss in 2000 and again in 2004...
All Comments
Paper ballots offer the means to verify and recount votes. Unfortunately, these and other paper trails will not ensure one-voter-one-vote-every-time with state-of-the-art independent, stand-alone vote counting machines. Optical ballot scanners are just as suspect as touch screens. Until we implement high-bar stringent guidelines for voting machine providers and elections officials to uphold, until we fix our election laws to protect us from machine and human error, and human interpretation our election process will continue to be broken.
Lani Massey Brown,
A MARGIN OF ERROR: BALLOTS OF STRAW, a novel
And every new version of the software SHOULD be recertified from scratch.
But Rubin's comments do apply to existing voting machine software, and are an excellent argument against using it. Every time gaping holes are found in its voting systems, Diebold cries, "But the next version fixes it!" Sure, we'll believe it when that version is shown to be free of security flaws by equally extensive testing.
Really? I thought Bush did a good job of 'patching' his loss in 2000 and again in 2004...